Marshall University

Marshall Digital Scholar
Criminal Justice Faculty Research

Criminal Justice

6-2013

The Only Thing That Stops a Guy with a Bad Policy
is a Guy with a Good Policy: An Examination of the
NRA’s “National School Shield” Proposal
Gordon A. Crews
Marshall University, crewsg@marshall.edu

Angela D. Crews
Marshall University, crewsa@marshall.edu

Catherine E. Burton

Follow this and additional works at: http://mds.marshall.edu/criminal_justice_faculty
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminology
and Criminal Justice Commons, and the Education Commons
Recommended Citation
Crews, G. A., Crews, A. D., & Burton, C. E. (2013). The Only Thing That Stops a Guy with a Bad Policy is a Guy with a Good Policy:
An Examination of the NRA’s “National School Shield” Proposal. American Journal of Criminal Justice, 38(2):183-199.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Criminal Justice at Marshall Digital Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Criminal
Justice Faculty Research by an authorized administrator of Marshall Digital Scholar. For more information, please contact zhangj@marshall.edu.

The only thing that stops a guy with a bad policy is a guy with a good policy:
An examination of the NRA’s "National School Shield" proposal

Gordon A. Crews, Marshall University
Angela D. Crews, Marshall University
Catherine E. Burton, The Citadel

Corresponding Author
Gordon A. Crews
Marshall University
Department of Criminal Justice & Criminology
One John Marshall Drive
Huntington, WV 25755
304-696-3083
crewsg@marshall.edu

Abstract
With the recent tragedy at Sandy Hook Elementary in Newtown, CT, the public and the
government are looking for solutions to school violence. The National Rifle Association (NRA),
a second amendment, pro-gun advocacy group, has proposed an "education and training
emergency response program" called The National School Shield, which advocates the
placement of armed security in schools. Although the program sounds provocative, serious
questions complicate its plausibility, necessity, motive, and effectiveness. Furthermore, the
potential policy and practical ramifications of encouraging armed security forces in U.S. schools
are complex. The authors examined the proposal's key elements from a public policy perspective
and determined that the NRA program would be expensive in terms of both implementation and
civil and/or criminal liability, would increase juvenile contact with the criminal justice system,
would increase the potential for injuries and deaths from firearms, and would potentially only
serve to increase profits for those invested in security industries. More potentially effective and
safe policy alternatives are offered.

Introduction
The NRA wants the public to believe that schools are not safe places to send children
(Hutchinson, December 23, 2012). This is currently becoming a widespread belief due, in part, to
speakers like Lt. Col. (ret.) Dave Grossman, developer of "killology," who proclaimed in a recent
address to the West Virginia Safe Schools Summit that school violence is the "leading cause of
death" of children (Grossman, 2013).
Both claims are flat-out untrue. To refute Grossman's claim, unintentional injury is the
leading cause of death among ages 5-24, although homicide is the second leading cause of death
among ages 15-24. While homicide by firearms is the leading cause of violence-related injury
death among ages 5-9 and 15-24, nearly all of these deaths occurred away from schools (Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010).
Contrary to the NRAs claim, school violence is decreasing (Robers, Zhang, Truman &
Snyder, 2012) and "schools are the safest place for a student to be" (Brock, as cited in Neuman,
2012). From 2009 to 2010, 33 violent deaths of students, staff, and non-students occurred at
schools. Of these, 17 school age youth (ages 5-18) were victims of homicide and 1 was a victim
of suicide. These figures represent the lowest number of total violent deaths since 1992 (when
this started being measured), the lowest number of student deaths since 2001-02, and the lowest
number of suicides since 1996-97. In fact, during the 2009-10 school year, there was only about
1 homicide or suicide of a school age youth at school for every 2.7 million students enrolled
(Robers et al., 2012).
School-age youth are much more at risk of violent death away from school. The most
recent available data indicate that, since 1992, less than 2% of youth violent deaths have
occurred at school (National Center for Injury Prevention & Control, 2012), which means that

more than 98% occurred elsewhere. When rape, sexual assault, robbery, and aggravated assault
are considered, rates at school in 2009-10 (4 per 1,000) did not statistically differ from those
occurring away from school (5 per 1,000).
Tragic incidents of school violence like the one at Sandy Hook Elementary School in
Newtown, CT on December 14, 2012, however, add fuel to the fire regarding school violence.
Naturally, a shooting that claims the lives of 20 children and 8 adults (including Adam and
Nancy Lanza) at a place where millions of people send their children every day results in
numerous calls for action. The majority of those calls revolve around two major areas- gun
control, and additional security measures for schools, including the use of armed security
personnel.
Those who advocate gun control measures focus primarily on the background check
process and loopholes in background checks related to the purchase of weapons from places
other than authorized dealers (e.g., gun shows), and on the availability of assault weapons and
high capacity magazines. Although school security includes several types of procedural tactics,
such as controlling access to school grounds and/or school buildings, metal detectors, requiring
visitors to sign-in, telephones in the classrooms, and security cameras to monitor the school,
those who advocate additional security measures as a solution focus on the placement of trained,
armed personnel in every school. This is the primary feature of The National School Shield
program proposed by the NRA.
Policy Implications and Practical Ramifications of The National School Shield Proposal
At a December 21, 2012 news conference, Wayne LaPierre, CEO and Executive Vice
President of the NRA, introduced former Congressman and former Director of the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) Asa Hutchinson, to give a brief overview of the program

(LaPierre, 2012). This overview mentioned “two key elements” which would be guided by his
“team of experts.” Those two key elements are the development of a model security plan, and
the use of community volunteers as armed security.
Team of Experts & Model Security Plans
Given the scope and potential impact of the NRA proposal, and the fact that it involves
children on a national level, it is essential to carefully examine its components. First, Hutchinson
discusses a "team of experts," but does not describe who would comprise this team, how they
would be selected, or who would evaluate their level of expertise. This team is supposed to take
the lead in fleshing out, developing, and implementing a proposal to address a complex, multifaceted issue involving the lives of millions of children and adults
Apparently, these individuals will be developing “model security plans” for schools to
follow, and consulting with school officials, law enforcement officials, and parents all across the
United States, although it is unclear who will pay these experts for their services and how much
it will cost. One major concern is the real probability that these experts may have conflicts of
interest because they could benefit financially and politically if schools adopt their programs and
purchase equipment and manpower required for program implementation. These potential
conflicts of interest are discussed below.
Use of Trained, Armed Security Personnel & Community Volunteers
The model security plan consists of a "comprehensive strategy for school security based
on the latest, most up-to-date technical information from the foremost experts in their fields”
(Hutchinson, 2012). Part of this plan is the use of “armed, trained, qualified school security
personnel," but Hutchinson notes that this would be “a decision to be made by parents at the
local level” (2012).

Hutchinson has publicly advocated the idea of placing trained guards to staff the proposal
and emphasized that untrained guards should not be placed in schools. Supporting Hutchinson's
position, a recent Gallup poll indicated that the majority of Americans surveyed, regardless of
political affiliation, believe that placing armed officers at schools is the answer to school
shooting tragedies (O’Brien, 2012).
Insert Table 1 About Here
Hutchinson is not the first to suggest armed guards in schools. It became a popular idea
after the Columbine shooting in 1999, and currently, approximately 27% of schools in the U.S.
have some sort of daily police or security presence (Snyder & Dillow, 2012). Richland County,
South Carolina, for example, has armed "Resource Officers" at all its middle and high schools,
while elementary schools have one officer for every two schools. Officer salaries are shared by
the school district and Richland County Sheriff’s Department (Rich, 2012).
However, concerns similar to those over the selection of the "team of experts" also
surface with respect to the selection of the “armed, trained, qualified school security personnel.”
Hutchinson has offered no elaboration on whether these personnel will be certified bonded police
officers who will assume these tasks as part of their official details, "moonlighting" police
officers who will work at schools "off-duty," retired police officers or military, private security
officers, existing school personnel (i.e., armed staff, teachers and/or administrators), or parents or
other community volunteers.
The selection, verification of qualifications (e.g., background checks; proficiency with
firearms), training, and certification of these individuals is critical, yet Hutchinson has offered no
insight into these processes or who will do them. It also is unknown what weapons these

personnel will use or have access to, or where and how those weapons will be stored and
maintained. Each of these concerns involves myriad liability issues which are addressed below.
Although Hutchinson emphasized that having armed security personnel is not the only
element of the plan, he did not elaborate on any other component. LaPierre, in his introductory
remarks, described a "multi-faceted program . . .developed by the very best experts in their
fields" consisting of everything from "building design and access control to information
technology to student and teacher training" (LaPierre, 2012). These hints of additional
programmatic aspects raise more questions about responsibility. It is an expensive endeavor to
design, modify, or construct a building. It also is expensive to update, install, or augment
information systems, or to modify, install, supplement, or change security systems. In 2006,
Education Department analysts in Connecticut estimated that a multiple camera security system
with a "buzzer" entry, scan cards, a "duress" alarm system with panic buttons, and a portal metal
detector with two trained security personnel for a large high school could cost up to $480,000
(Lohman & Shepard, 2006). This would be much higher in 2013 dollars.
Someone will be hired to do build or modify buildings, to install or update security
systems, and to provide metal detectors. Someone will be selected to provide (i.e., sell)
equipment, supplies, hardware, and software. Someone will be hired to monitor and maintain all
of the equipments, systems, hardware, and software. Someone will be hired to train and equip
personnel. Conveniently, “the National Rifle Association is the natural, obvious choice to
sponsor" the program (Hutchinson, 2012). Of concern, however, is such a seemingly readymade provider of all things necessary for the level of school security required for the safety of
children. Clearly, conflicts of interest abound.

The second key element is the use of community volunteers to avoid "massive funding
from local authorities or the federal government" (Hutchinson, 2012). Setting aside the issue of
funding for the moment because LaPierre (2012) declared in his introduction that Hutchinson
would have a "budget provided by the NRA of whatever scope" required, allowing armed
community volunteers to have such intimate access to children and school personnel would seem
to increase the risk of harm.
Requirements for background checks of those involved with public schools vary widely
from state to state. While 25 states and the District of Columbia require criminal history checks
for all public school employees, only 5 require such checks of all contractors, and only 8 require
checks of individuals that volunteer (Government Accountability Office, 2010). When checks
are required, "they may not be adequate because they are not national, fingerprint-based, or
recurring" (GAO, 2010, p. 6). Moreover, many states have no restrictions on employing former
sex offenders.
Even when background checks are conducted, people with bad intentions can sometimes
make their way to positions of power and authority. For example, in 2010, the owner of a
security company and chief of security for a public school district in Wyoming, Michigan, was
charged with 2 counts of criminal sexual conduct after using his position to have sex with a then14 year old girl on at least 2 occasions (McCann, 2010). During the first 44 days of 2013, the
following 22 criminal incidents involving security guards or officers have been reported on
Private Officer News Network (privateofficernews.wordpress.com):





security guard in Newport News, VA arrested for home burglary
security guard in St. Augustine, FL arrested for burglary, theft, exploitation of the elderly
security guard in New Orleans, LA arrested for illegal use of a weapon
security guard on probation in Redding, CA arrested for meth possession, possession of
an unlawful weapon, possession of ammunition by a felon, and felony probation violation




















security guard in Jackson, TN arrested for felony vandalism after destroying Jewish
artifacts
security officer in Murrells Inlet, SC arrested for shoplifting
school security guard in Homestead, FL is under investigation for sexual assault
school district Security Supervisor and former police sergeant in Wichita, KS arrested for
indecent liberties with a child and criminal sodomy
security guard in Orange County, FL arrested for shining a laser at a sheriff's helicopter
armored car driver in Bryan, TX arrested for armed robbery
security guard in Memphis, TN arrested for attempted murder
campus security guard in Middletown, CT arrested for a string of felony thefts
Walt Disney World security guard in Davenport, FL arrested for 8 counts of possession
of child pornography
security guard in Spring Hill, FL arrested for credit card fraud
middle school security guard in Little Rock, AR arrested for 2 counts of second degree
sexual assault
2 TSA officers in Atlanta, GA arrested for conspiring to smuggle drugs
a security guard in Atlanta, GA, with a history of mental illness, convicted of murder
a State Department security officer in Alexandria, VA convicted of accepting bribes
a school security guard in Tacoma, WA arrested for 3 counts of first degree sexual
misconduct with a minor
2 security guards in Memphis, TN arrested for aggravated assault
an unarmed school security guard in Garfield, NJ arrested for impersonating an officer,
possession of a weapon without a permit and possession of a weapon on school property
security guard at a middle school in Little Rock, AR arrested for second degree sexual
assault involving a minor
If security guards are placed in every school in the United States, it is frightening to think

how this problem would be exponentially magnified. Using local volunteers would seem to
exacerbate the potential for unqualified, criminal, and/or ill-intentioned individuals to take
advantage of such unique, and potentially unsupervised, access to children. Allowing more
people into schools will give more people access to the children. If a child is harmed by an
overly zealous armed security member or sexually assaulted by a pedophile that has slipped
through the system, someone would have to be held liable. This very real potential is not worth
the risk of hiring community volunteers who may not be subjected to thorough national-level,

fingerprint-based background checks that are repeated on a regular basis, especially when
officers who have been through such checks commit crimes such as the ones listed above.
Hutchinson described a program at his son's school in his home state of Arkansas, where
2 of the 22 criminal incidents above occurred at middle schools, called “Watchdog Dads.” In
this program, fathers of school children “volunteer their time at schools to patrol playgrounds
and provide a measure of added security” (Hutchinson, 2012). Although Arkansas is one of the
few states that does require national, fingerprint-based background checks on all teachers and on
all non-licensed personnel (GAO, 2010), this is a rarity, and apparently people with ill intent still
slip through. Hutchinson implies the NRA program would function similar to this program
except that the dads would be armed. However, simply being a parent of a child confers neither
the right, nor the ability, nor the responsibility to oversee others’ children.
Hutchinson concluded his second key element by offering the assurance that “whether
they're retired police, retired military or rescue personnel, I think there are people in every
community in this country, who would be happy to serve, if only someone asked them and gave
them the training and certification to do so” (Hutchinson, 2012). In difficult economic times and
increased public fear, people often will turn to anyone or anything for help. When available
options seem to be essentially “free” in the reality of dwindling school budgets, they are very
attractive. Moreover, when those options seem to alleviate external pressures, such as parental
fear, they become almost impossible to turn down. Will, and more importantly, can schools, in
their desperation to protect children and alleviate parental and public fear, be vigilant enough to
know who they are trusting with access to their children?
Hutchinson asserts that the NRA's “gun safety, marksmanship and hunter education
programs have set the standard for well over a century," and that "over the past 25 years, their

Eddie Eagle Gunsafe Program has taught over 26 million kids that real guns aren't toys and
today, child gun accidents are at the lowest levels ever recorded” (Hutchinson, 2012). However,
this assurance does not negate the potential issues that would arise if the NRA does become
responsible for the training of most, if not all, of the armed security officers under this plan. The
NRA is still a private organization with very little, if any, governmental control or oversight.
Currently, those who participate in their training programs do so willingly and accept any
liability or injury that may occur to themselves or others they encounter. If their training
becomes mandated to some, they must accept the inherent liability which comes with training for
those who will serve the public in such a crucial and dangerous role. The potential for that
liability looms large for anyone who “certifies” that another person knows how, and more
importantly, when to fire a weapon. The school environment simply exacerbates this potential
problem.
Responsibility and Liability Issues
The success of the NRA proposal rests on the assumption that putting more guns in
schools will keep guns out of schools. LaPierre argues that Gun-Free Zones are an “invitation to
mayhem,” to those wishing to harm children (Sullivan, 2012). These zones are well-advertised
to inform everyone coming onto school property that all firearms, except those carried by
security personnel, are banned on school property, and that anyone violating that policy can be
arrested. LaPierre believes that these zones are places where potential perpetrators are
guaranteed access to large numbers of children with little or no chance of being confronted by
anyone with a weapon and he uses this as a foundation for the recommendation that all schools
have armed security. In essence, LaPierre recommends that problems stemming from weapons
can be solved by weapons (LaPierre, 2012).

This concept has a serious potential flaw. The presence of armed security means the
presence of weapons. Law enforcement officers are taught to remember that even if they
encounter someone without a weapon, a weapon is still present, theirs. Even schools that are
truly successful in preventing students from bringing weapons onto school grounds will still have
weapons if armed security is present. Students may have their cars searched in the school
parking lot, have their persons searched at the school entrance, and have their lockers randomly
searched to prevent them from carrying a weapon on school property. However, those same
students will know that they do not need to bring weapons to school, weapons will be there. The
only remaining question at that point is how to obtain one of those weapons. It is easy to
imagine that the more desire a student has to obtain a weapon, the more violence that student will
generate to obtain it.
Another concern is the potential liability that is involved with increasing the risk to
children, to staff, and to the security officers themselves. If sworn police officers provide this
security as part of their duty assignment, then the liability is assumed by that police jurisdiction.
"Moonlighting" officers, who would be providing security "off-duty," outside of their normal job
requirements, would likely not be covered and either the school district or the officer would have
to purchase supplemental liability insurance. Luckily, retired police officers can purchase up to
$250,000 of "retired law enforcement officer self-defense coverage," provided by the "NRA
Endorsed Property & Casualty Insurance Program" and administered by Lockton Affinity, LLC
(http://www.locktonrisk.com/nrains/retiredofficer.htm), but it is not clear whether this insurance
would cover the retired police officer who chose to take a position providing security for a
school. Individuals who are hired and trained by private security providers would be insured
against liability by the agency. It is unclear whether any liability insurance would cover trained,

armed community volunteers, but if it would, the cost of that insurance would most likely be
borne by the individual or by the school district and this cost could quickly become prohibitive.
Numerous scenarios become evident when thinking about the potential liability of those
placed in school security positions. Even firing on a would-be school shooter trying to enter a
school would likely bring civil suits from that person's family. In addition, if a shooter happened
to make it past security, even more significant liability issues arise. If an innocent bystander is
injured or killed by that security person or if the security person does not act quickly enough and
the shooter injures or kills students or staff, that officer can potentially be held liable. These are
all scenarios that any school district hiring security staff must consider.
In addition to liability related to those the security is intended to protect, the security
personnel are at risk of injury or death. In 2012, 112 private security officers died or were killed
on-duty; 58% of the officers died from shootings, 13% from trauma, 8% from stabbings, and the
remainder from medical issues, industrial or car accidents, and drowning. Overall, more than
70,000 incidents were reported involving private security officers as the targets of violence
(verbal and physical assault) (Private Officer International, 2013). Between January 1 and
February 11, 2013, 14 deaths of private security officers were reported (Private Officer
International, 2013), but it is not clear how many of these officers were armed.
As more schools add more armed security, and as schools establish armories full of high
powered weapons which are to be immediately available in emergencies, the potential risk and
liability exponentially increases. Individuals who carry these weapons must know how to use
them, when to use them, and how to maintain control of them. More weapons in schools, no
matter who has them, the more chances for them to fall into the wrong hands and be used

unsafely and/or unlawfully. There is always inherent liability and danger for those who carry
guns as well as those who allow them to be carried.
Insert Table 2 About Here
Impact on Individual Freedoms and Choice of Employers and Employees
Another area of potential conflict is the freedom of choice of those involved either
directly by being required to carry a weapon or peripherally by having to conduct daily business
with colleagues who are armed. This is evidenced in many jurisdictions who are already
implementing programs similar to the one proposed by the NRA. While the NRA proposal does
not recommend that school administrators, teachers, and staff be armed, many schools are
allowing their teachers, principals, and/or custodial and maintenance staff to bring concealed
weapons to their campuses (McKinley, 2008), and several states are currently considering
legislation that would allow this (e.g., Colorado, Michigan). As of January 15, 2013, 18 states
allow adults to carry firearms on school grounds with written permission from a principal or
school board (Huffington Post, 2013).
Numerous recent surveys of educators in K-12 schools have offered a glimpse into what
American teachers may be thinking with respect to the issue of more guns in their schools.
Teachers in Connecticut, for example, "overwhelmingly oppose having its workforce carry guns
on campus" (Thomas, 2013), and 67% of teachers in California believe hiring a counselor would
be more effective at preventing school violence than hiring a police officer (McGreevy, 2013).
Various teachers unions, such as the one in Fairfax County, Virginia, voice similar concerns,
with more than 60% of the union members in that county saying they did not want guns in
schools (Hendry, 2013). The majority of surveys and polls indicate that most teachers do not
want teachers, staff, or administrators carrying guns, and especially do not want to carry one.

School boards, however, may have different perceptions which could lead to tension between
teachers and district administrators.
Kenneth S. Trump, President of National School Safety and Security Services, "advises
against arming teachers and school staff" and outlines at least 9 considerations, many related to
civil liability, for schools considering arming teachers or other staff (National School Safety and
Security Services, 2013). Civil suits, and possibly charges of criminal negligence against school
districts are likely when those districts assume responsibility for the actions of teachers who are
required to carry weapons or who are forced to interact closely with others who carry weapons.
This would not be an inexpensive undertaking.
Parents and other community members also have a say and the NRA proposal is getting
mixed reviews (Zagorski, 2012). LaPierre and Hutchinson both stated that the choice of whether
a local school will have armed security (whatever that may mean) is a choice to be made by local
parents. Theoretically, this is plausible, but practically, it could be a logistical nightmare. Given
the amount of national debate generated immediately following any shooting at an American
school, it is safe to assume that those debates at the local levels could become heated.
Obviously, these decisions will reflect popular opinion at the local levels, but that might
not be smart policy. With this type of potentially litigious decision, it is probably not advisable
to let majority rule on a decision that will impact the lives of everyone from the students to the
teaching faculty to the staff to the parents. If the parents decide to allow armed faculty, the
school district will ultimately be responsible for suits and criminal charges arising from bad
choices or accidents that injure or kill someone.

The Profit Motive
Some estimate that funding the NRA proposal will cost $4 to $6 billion, while
Hutchinson puts forth a more conservative estimate of $2 to $3 billion. Either estimate means
huge potential profits for private security companies (Murphy, 2012; O’Brien, 2012). Although
LaPierre (2012) declared in his introduction that Hutchinson would have a "budget provided by
the NRA of whatever scope" required, this budget most assuredly only refers to plan
development and not implementation. Implementing the plan would certainly fall to school
districts requiring them to use local and/or state tax dollars to recruit trained, armed volunteers,
to recruit volunteers that they must train and arm, to hire trained, armed private security, or to
divert public law enforcement services. Except for using public law enforcement, each of the
above options would require training and/or personnel, which would necessitate the involvement
of entities that provide security training and/or personnel.
If school districts contract with existing private security agencies, which is one of the
least costly options, the quality of protection may be at stake.

Although private security

contractors have widely been used in many government sponsored initiatives, such as the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan, more experienced contractors have complained that the pool of security
officers has been diluted by lowered qualifications, which has led to decreased salaries and
benefits (Kelly, 2011). In any private endeavor, profit is an inherent factor. Profit may or may
not be achieved at the sacrifice of quality, but there is less regulation and recourse in the private
security industry than in government agencies.
In addition to the potential financial boon for the security industry, other industries stand
to profit handsomely. With the movie theater shooting in Aurora, Colorado, and the school
shooting in Newtown, we see various products making their way to the marketplace promising

parents that their children will be safer.

For example, a company is offering bullet-proof

backpacks (Dewey, 2012). Sales of the backpacks soared to such a level after the Newtown
shootings that their website crashed at least once (CBSLA.com, 2012). The effectiveness of such
products seems to be lost in the fear many have after such tragic incidents. Students often are
prohibited by school policy from wearing their backpacks during the day, so the actual practical
protection is little and the backpacks can only stop the types of ammunition used in some of the
shootings. Furthermore, statistics indicate that schools are very safe and that the psychological
presence of armed guards and these kinds of products being offered via the security industry can
have damaging psychological effects (Dewey, 2012; Jennings, Khey, Maskaly, and Donner,
2011).
The Line Between Public and Private Becomes a Slippery Slope
It has been 12 years since the Columbine school shooting tragedy and the United States is
no closer to an effective solution for school violence. Columbine spurred the nation to
implement zero tolerance policies, video surveillance, and armed guards or police officers in
schools. The research to date is sparse, but some of the studies indicate that the efforts have been
counterproductive in that they have yielded decreased attendance as well as an increase in arrest
for minor offenses (Skiba, 2012; Jennings, Khey, Maskalay, and Donner, 2011).
If the U.S. follows the NRA proposal and insists that every public school have an armed
officer, it is hard to know where the line will be drawn if it is followed to its logical conclusion.
School bus violence, for example, has increased in recent years (Lang, 2005). Perhaps buses that
provide transportation also will be required to have surveillance systems and armed drivers or
guards. Additionally, school yards and playgrounds, where violence has been known to take
place, are open territories with little protection or surveillance. Prohibiting outdoor activities or

providing guards in watchtowers would turn schools into prison-like environments instead of
environments conducive to learning.
Implementing security ideas from fields that have an impact on school safety is possible.
Architecture, for example, has long been contributing to school security in terms of designing
and building educational structures that are both aesthetically pleasing and safe (Halbig, 2008).
Security measures have been incorporated into school design since Columbine, but many
currently are calling for an examination of how additional security measure can be incorporated
into education venues.
Again, balance may be the key. Numerous architectural features may assist in school
safety without turning schools into prison-like fortresses. Some examples are single school
entrances, automatically locking doors, reduced landscaping, relocating restrooms away from the
entrance, creating a separate entrance for employees, and designating lanes in front of school
entrances to only be accessible by buses (Crow, 2000; Gubrecht, 2012).
It is not possible to prevent all school shootings, even with additional security measures.
An examination of the security policy at Sandy Hook Elementary would probably reveal that
school officials responded appropriately and could not have prevented the shooting, regardless of
police presence or additional architectural security measures. The U.S. secures airports and
courthouses as government-run public spaces, but a worrisome question about the potential
extent of these security precautions is whether these measures eventually will be forced upon
privately owned public spaces. Some shopping malls, for example, often provide small private
security forces, but if the NRA policy is implemented in schools, other public places may be
pressured to follow suit.

Many advocates of the NRA policy point to Israel as an example of a country that places
armed guards in all schools. Israel also places armed guards at restaurants, malls, parking lots,
and many other public spaces (Associated Press, 2012). If Israel is the role model for successful
school security policy, other areas may follow. The U.S. and Israel, however, differ in two
fundamental ways regarding gun control. First, Israel has strict gun laws and does not guarantee
the right to bear arms under its constitution. A gun license in Israel requires several layers of
screening and renewal every three years, which is not automatic. Second, Israel requires every
able citizen to serve a term in the military, which teaches the proper use of firearms. Even Israeli
military personnel who use guns while serving still have to apply for licenses to keep guns as
private citizens and are subject to the same renewal policy as any other citizen (Associated Press,
2012). Israeli officials have said that the actions proposed by the NRA are not comparable to
Israel's. In fact, Israeli officials contend that they have armed guards at schools as part of their
comprehensive strategy to combat terrorism and do not recommend the NRA policy given that
school shootings are not linked to national security in the U.S. (Associated Press, 2012).
Conclusion
The resolution to school violence, especially mass shootings like the ones at Columbine
and Newtown, is not simple. The NRA, however, proposes a superficially simple solution in its
National School Shield program with armed security personnel comprised of community
volunteers with implementation funded primarily by local dollars. Preventing school violence by
focusing on the symptom of the problem is not the answer. As many emphasized after
Newtown, the problem is troubled students, many who have suffered from significant mental
health issues, behavioral disorders, and the systemic neglect of parents and teachers (Newman,

2004). The availability of weapons, especially assault-type weapons compounds the issue
(Crews & Crews, 2013).
To prevent school violence, society must first address troubled youth who have easy
access to weapons. Although scholars have been reluctant to develop any "profile" of school
shooters, case studies have found that many had known or suspected mental health issues, family
dysfunction, school problems, and social isolation, not necessarily as “loners,” but perhaps in
small, close-knit groups of “outsider” youth (Crews & Crews, 2013; Newman, 2004). In many
cases, but not all, the shooter had been bullied. Many had problems with just one or two students
and several shooters recently had experienced the end of a close relationship. Depression and
planned or completed suicide was common. Several living school shooters had initially planned
only to kill themselves at school, but ended up feeling cornered and that they had nothing to lose
by taking others with them (Crews & Crews, 2013). More shooters have killed themselves
(suicide or “suicide by cop” during or immediately after the incident, or suicide while
incarcerated) than currently are alive (Crews & Crews, 2013). Finally, nearly all shooters had
told one or more peers or adults about their plans (Crews & Crews, 2013; Newman, 2004).
When concerned friends did report to an adult, they were not taken seriously or the reports were
made too late.
It is unclear whether armed guards prevent school violence. In fact, a recent study found
the presence of armed guards in New Orleans schools to be correlated with higher rates of school
violence (Jennings, Khey, Maskaly & Donner, 2011). It is even less clear whether an armed
security force comprised of community volunteers would prevent school violence.
According to the most recent data (2007-2008), 27% of elementary and secondary
schools in the United States have daily police or security presence (Snyder & Dillow, 2012),

although it is not readily ascertainable what percentage are armed. In fact, armed guards were
employed both by Columbine High School and Virginia Tech, where two of the most deadly
school shootings have occurred. Security involved in one recent incident claims that a shooting
was interrupted by an armed officer before it resulted in serious injuries or deaths. At least 5
people, however, were shot or injured by flying glass at Granite Hills High School near San
Diego when an El Cajon police officer shot and immobilized the student, 17 year old Jason
Hoffman, before he could enter the building (Moore, 2012). Hoffman succeeded, after two failed
attempts, in hanging himself in jail while he awaited sentencing (Perry, 2001).
On the other hand, it is clear that schools with armed security have their students arrested
or detained at nearly five times the rate of schools without armed guards (Shen, 2013). Students,
who would be made to serve detention or suspended for a few days in schools without armed
security, are going to juvenile detention or adult jail for behaviors ranging from disorderly
conduct to violating the dress code.
Moreover, black students are more likely to be arrested. In October, 2012, the U.S.
Justice Department filed a suit against the City of Meridian, Lauderdale County, and the
Mississippi Division of Youth Services alleging that armed guards at their schools routinely
violated the due process rights of children, particularly of black and disabled students. Armed
officers are accused of handcuffing, detaining, arresting and incarcerating students without
informing of their rights, without timely probable cause hearings, and without legal
representation, for minor offenses such as school disciplinary infractions (Department of Justice,
2012).
President Obama has called for $155 million for mental health services and to develop
police/school partnerships, $150 million for school districts to train teachers and staff, to hire

“school resource officers,” psychologists, counselors, and social workers, and to upgrade
security equipment and emergency plans, $50 million for staff and teacher training, and $30
million in one-time grants to assist school districts in developing and implementing emergency
plans (Gray, 2013). Although $385 million sounds like a lot of money, it is just a drop in the
bucket.
A hypothetical state with only 1 high school in each of its 140 districts would spend
about $555,000 per school, or a total of $77.7 million on enhanced security systems with
cameras, access-control systems, duress alarm systems, safety film, and on one security officer
per school per year (Lohman & Shepard, 2006; Gray, 2013). The $385 million, then, would not
go very far, covering only about 5 states (given the above scenario). Although helpful, these
funds would have to be supplemented by significant local, state, or private funding (e.g., the
NRA).
Preventing school violence does not have to be expensive. All it takes is preventing the
development of young men and women into perpetrators of school violence, and putting armed
guards at fortified schools will not do this. It requires the development of early recognition
programs run by individuals trained to spot warning signs and situations that are correlated with
violence. It requires the development of intervention programs staffed by professionals trained
in defusing potentially violent situations and addressing those correlates, whether they are mental
health problems, family issues, bully issues, relationship issues, conflict resolution issues, or
self-esteem issues. In other words, it just requires someone to pay attention, to listen, and to
care, which really cost nothing.
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Table 1
Advantages and Disadvantages of Trained, Armed Security Guards & Community Volunteers
Advantages

Disadvantages

Decreased public fear

Increased potential for accidents

Increased public perceptions of safety

False sense of security

Quicker response time to incidents

Increased potential for civil and/or criminal liability

Potential to intervene and prevent or reduce harm

Increased availability of weapons

May dissuade less motivated potential offenders

Providing more people greater access to children

Increased profits for security industry

Increased cost to school districts
Increased referrals to juvenile justice system
Decreased graduation rates/Increased dropouts
Increased fear and resentment among children
Potential negative impact on school climate
Potential diversion of law enforcement resources
Insurance and Worker's Compensation issues
Potential union conflicts
Officer cooperation & morale

Table 1

Table 2
Liability Issues Related to Armed Guards in Schools
Potential Liability
Type of Officers
On-duty, off-duty, retired public police officers
Current or former military/National Guard
Private security
Parents/Community Volunteers
Recruitment of Officers
Misrepresentation of duties
Selection of Officers
Criminal history checks
Drug testing
Psychological evaluations
Physical qualifications
Training of Officers
Firearms training
Criminal procedure dealing with juveniles
Interviewing & interrogating juveniles
Search & seizure with juveniles
Detention/arrest of juveniles
Investigations in a school environment
Psychology of juveniles
Dealing with parents
Transporting/transferring juveniles
Juvenile petitions
Testifying in detention hearings
Supervision of Officers
Oversight of daily operations
Reporting of problems with officers
Duty or Failure to Act
Protect others or fail to protect others
Departmental Policies, Rules & Regulations
Zero Tolerance versus Selective Enforcement
Potential for bias & discrimination
Treatment of minor or school infractions
Access to Facilities
Rooms, equipment, records
Access to Children
Power & authority
Abuse of trust
Personal Relationships with Children
Potential for bias (positive or negative)
Student Rights to Privacy
Table 2

Who is Potentially Held Liable?
School Boards

Police Departments, School Boards, Private
Security Agencies, Consulting Firms
Police Departments, School Boards, Private
Security Agencies, Consulting Firms

Police Departments, Local or State Training
Academies, Private Security Agencies, Private
Consultants

Police Departments, Private Security Agencies,
School Boards, Principals
Police Departments, Private Security Agencies,
School Boards, Principals, Teachers, Individuals
Police Departments, Private Security Agencies
Police Departments, Private Security Agencies,
School Boards, Principals, Individuals
Police Departments, Private Security Agencies,
School Boards, Principals, Individuals
Police Departments, Private Security Agencies,
School Boards, Principals, Individuals
Police Departments, Private Security Agencies,
School Boards, Principals, Individuals
Police Departments, Private Security Agencies,
School Boards, Principals, Teachers, Individuals

